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SURVEY OF REAL PROPERTY LAW
RALPH E. BOYER*
I NTRODUCTION
In the field of real property law the struggle for marketability continues
to loom as the dominant factor. The conduct of the participants, the
Legislature and the Supreme Court, may be characterized as action and
reaction, with each maintaining a watchful eye on the other. Instances
are readily apparent in the following article, but by way of illustration,
attention is directed to the discussion under Reverter rights and tax deeds
immediately following this introduction.
The material for this survey is divided into seven main topics:
I. Legislation
II. Vendor and Purchaser
III. Estates, Dower, Homestead and Future Interests
IV. Deeds: Recording, Cancellation, Delivery
V. Rights in Land
VI. Mortgages and Liens
VII. Special Titles
Legislative changes, for purposes of emphasis, are discussed separately in
the beginning of the article. However, reference to such legislation, when
applicable, is also made in later sections. It is hoped that by a generous
use of headings and subheadings easy access to the subject matter will be
achieved.
I. LEGISLATION
Reverter rights and tax deeds.-One of the most important acts of
the 1955 legislature' amended Florida Statutes, Section 192.33, to provide
specifically that reverter rights, that is, possibilities of reverter and rights
of re-entry, shall not survive a tax deed or a master's deed issued pursuant
to a foreclosure of a tax certificate. Prior to this act, the aforementioned
section provided that restrictive covenants running with the land should
survive and be enforceable after the issuance of such a deed. The 1955
amendment relates specifically to the third unnumbered paragraph of this
section. It expressly states that "it being among other things the specific
intention of the legislature that all forfeitures, rights of re-entry, and
reverter rights shall be destroyed and shall not survive to the grantee in
such tax deed or master's deed, or to his or its heirs, successors and
assigns."0
*Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
1. Laws of Fla, c. 29959 (1955); FLA. STAT. § 192.33 (1955).
2. Ibid.
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This legislation was undoubtedly the result of the decision in the
Biltmore Village case. ' In this case the majority held by inference, or at
least assumed, that such possibilities of reverter or rights of re-entry did
survive tax deeds. Both the case and the legislation are best understood
in historical perspective. In 1951 the Florida legislature enacted Section
689.18 of the Florida Statutes limiting the effectiveness of reverter and
forfeiture provisions in private conveyances to a duration of twenty-one
years.' This statute was construed in the Biltmore Village case,5 and, as
applied to pre-existing reverter provisions, was held unconstitutional in that
it violated the impairment of contract and the due process clauses of the
State and Federal Constitutions.0  Both grantees involved in the Biltmore
case derived their titles through tax deeds, one of them claiming through
a Murphy deed.7  Insofar as the majority decision held that the statute
was unconstitutional as applied to pre-existing reverter rights, it seemed
to necessarily follow that such reverter rights did in fact survive tax titles.
It was pointed out by the dissenting judge8 that such a holding was
inconsistent with the usual theory that a tax deed creates a new and
independent title. Covenants, as distinguished from reverter rights, do
survive such tax deeds as a result of express legislation.9 The new statute
thus clarifies the situation and makes it clear that the tax deed will
nullify or abolish any pre-existing reverter rights although it will not abolish
restrictive covenants. The legislation should have a salutary effect on the
validity and marketability of Florida tax titles.
Mortgage foreclosure.--Chapter 29700, Florida Laws 1955, was enacted
to clarify Chapter 28093 of the Florida Laws of 1953 which amended Florida
Statutes, Section 702.02. The 1953 legislation provided for the foreclosure
of mortgages by a sale conducted by the clerk of the court. The 1955 legisla-
ture declares that the foreclosure procedure of the 1953 legislation is an
alternative method and not an exclusive one.'0 The new act specifically
provides that foreclosure may be by the clerk of the court, or in accordance
with procedures heretofore in existence prior to the enactment of that
statute. Such pre-existing procedures undoubtedly refer to chancery pro-
ceedings with the aid of masters.
Partition.-Chapter 29928 of Florida Laws of 1955 amends the parti-
tion laws of Florida. It provides for the sale of the land upon an uncon-
tested allegation that the property is not divisible and not subject to
3. Biltmore Village, Inc. v. Rotolante, 71 So.2d 727 (Hia. 1954).
4. Stephenson, Constitutional Inviolability of Possibilities of Reverter and Rights
of Entry in Florida, 6 MIArsII L.Q. 162 (1952).
5. Note 3 supra.
6. Ibid. See also case note 9 MIANH L.Q. 232 (1955), and Boyer, Survey of
Real Property, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 411 (1954).
7. Laws of Fla., c. 18296 (1937); FLA. STAT. §§ 192.35-192.38 (1953).
8. Biltmore Village, Inc., v. Rotolante, 71 So.2d 727, 729 (Fla. 1954).
9. FIA. STAT. J§. 19233-61 (1955). The new legislation does not change t]]is
provision.
10. Laws of Fla., c. 29700 (1955); FLA. STAT. § 702.02 (1955).
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partition without prejudice to the owners. The court, if satisfied that such
allegation is correct, upon application of either party and notice to others
before the court, may appoint a special master to make sale of the property
either at a private sale or in the same manner as provided for the sale
thereof by Section 66.07. This act should have a beneficial effect in clearing
titles to real estate where there are co-owners and one or more of the parties
is unable to be found. In those cases where land is conveyed after a parti-
tion sale with the court holding part of the proceeds for the absent parties,
this section should help marketability and help put the land back in com-
merce. Another act relating to partition is Chapter 29685 which amends
Florida Statutes, Section 66.06. This statute relates to the compensation
of commissioners in partition proceedings. It removes the three dollars
per day limitation on compensation and permits the court to allow any
amount it deems reasonable for such services.
Statutes of limitations.-A new statute of limitations or curative act
was enacted by Chapter 29954. This statute concisely provides that no
judgment, order or decree of any court shall be a lien upon real or per-
sonal property in the state after the expiration of twenty years from the
date of the entry of such judgment, order or decree. This act complements
existing statutes and should aid marketability of titles. Florida Statutes,
Section 95.11 provides that an action based upon a judgment or decree of
a court of record may be brought within twenty years. Such a statute would
preclude an action based on a judgment more than twenty years old and
normally would dissipate the lien although the statute does not specifically
say that the judgment or decree shall cease to be a lien after that time.
If no action can be brought on the judgment or decree, its effectiveness
is certainly nullified. The new act, however, does eliminate any possibility
of the lien continuing after twenty years and clouding title to real estate.
It should preclude any dickering by overcautious attorneys.
Florida Statutes, Section 95.28, was amended by Chapter 29977, Laws of
Florida 1955, to provide specifically that when a mortgage is barred by the
twenty year statute of limitations, recovery also will be denied to the mort-
gagee for the payment of taxes. Such a recovery will be permitted if the
mortgagee obtains an assignment from the State of the fax sale certificates,
but the mere redeeming of the tax certificatcs shall be insufficient for such
subrogation purposes. This statute was undoubtedly prompted by the
Kirtley case" where foreclosure was attempted more than twenty years after
the mortgage was due. The mortgagee claimed principal, interest and taxes
as proper items of recovery. It was held that Section 95.28, Florida Statutes
barred the action on the foreclosure of the mortgage, but that the plaintiff
was entitled to recover for the taxes which he paid on the property during
the default of the mortgagor. The court stated "the amount thus expended
for the payment of taxes by the mortgagee was an expenditure which the
11. ILK L. Realty Corp. v. Kirtley, 74 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1954).
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mortgagee was forced to make by reason of the neglect of the mortgagor
to carry out his covenant to pay all taxes as they became due. Under these
circumstances the mortgagee is entitled to be subrogated to the paramount
lien of the state, as to which the statute of non-claim does not apply.'
12
The 1955 legislation, changing the rule of the above case, specifically pro-
vides that "all such obligations, including taxes paid by the mortgagee, the
period of limitation shall be twenty (20) years, provided, however, that
a mortgagee shall have no rights of subrogation to the lien of the state,
for taxes paid by said mortgagee to protect the security of his mortgage
unless said mortgagee obtains an assignment from the state of the tax sale
certificates, and, provided, further, that the mere receiving of the tax certi-
ficates shall be insufficient for such subrogation purposes."' 3  This legisla-
tion should be an important factor in clearing title to real estate. Under
the decision of the Kirtley case,' 4 the purchaser of real property could not
rely on the statute of limitations provided in Section 95.28 as the mortgagee
may have paid the taxes and could assert a claim for them. The amendment
is certainly justified. The new legislation does not affect the exempt
mortgages and liens specified in Florida Statutes, Section 95.32 and the
extension agreements provided for in Section 95.29.
Limitations on tax certificates.-Chapter 29794, Florida Laws 1955,
provides a statute of limitations for the enforcement of tax sale certificates
obtained in connection with the provisions of Chapter 18296, Laws of
Florida, 1937, commonly known as the Murphy Act. The 1955 legislation
provides that all such certificates held by private holders, natural or cor-
porate, or persons under a disability or otherwise, shall be deemed and
held to be barred by this act from and after midnight, June 30, 1956. Provi-
sion is also made for the clerk of the Circuit Court to cancel all such tax
certificates after the effective date of the act, and an exemption is provided
for those tax sale certificates held by the clerk of the Circuit Courts on
behalf of the state, by virtue of which title to the land vested in the state
under Section 192.38, Florida Statutes.
Decedents' estates; eminent domain; miscellaneous.-Chapter 29714,
Florida Laws 1955, concerns the estates of decedents. This act amends
Section 733.13, Florida Statutes relating to the appointment of commis-
sioners to allot dower. It provides that the county judge may, in his dis-
cretion, allot and set off dower and dispense with such appointment when:
(a) interested parties agree to the allotment of dower; or (b) assets are
of such nature that dower may be alloted without the appointment of
commissioners. This act also amends Section 733.43, Florida Statutes
relating to the annual and final returns required of personal representation
concerning the estates of a decedent. It provides that it shall not be
12. Id. at 878-879.
13. Laws of Fla., c. 29977 (1955); FLA. STAT. § 95.28 (1955).
14. Note 11 sutpra.
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necessary to file such a return, or advertise notice thereof, where there is a
single heir of a beneficiary, or where all heirs or beneficiaries are sui iuris and
consent thereto in writing, unless required by the county judge.
An amendment to Florida Statutes, Section 73.10, relating to eminent
domain trials, was enacted by Chapter 29729. The new act provides that
the property shall be viewed by the jury only upon demand by counsel for
any party prior to presentation of evidence or by order of court on its own
motion. The former section provided for a view in all cases unless the
parties consented to dispense therewith. The condemnation statutes were
further amended by Chapter 29915, Florida Laws 1955, concerning the
payment of money into the court where it is determined that the petitioner
is entitled to possession of the property prior to final judgment. As in the
old statute,' 5 such sum shall in no event be less than double the value as
fixed by the court appraisers. Whereas the old statute, however, required
the sum to be deposited within ten days after date of such order, the new
act allows the petitioner twenty days in which to deposit the money. Fur-
ther, the new act provides that such sum shall not be charged with com-
missions or poundage.
A new act' 6 provides that the state may be named a party in civil
actions to quiet title or foreclose a mortgage or other lien on real or personal
property in which the state has or claims such mortgage or other lien.
Provision is made for service on the state, and it is required that the com-
plaint set forth with particularity the nature of the state's interest. It is
provided that the judicial sale shall discharge the lien held by the state
to the same extent as provided by law, but a sale satisfying an inferior lien
shall not disturb the state's lien unless the state consents to sale free from
its lien and receives a proper share of the proceeds.
Another curative act was adopted by Chapter 29995. It provides that
judgments recorded under Section 28.221, Florida Statutes are validated
and confirmed and declared to be liens on the real property the same as
if a certified transcript thereof had been recorded in the judgment lien
record. Chapter 29857 provides that delivery of an insurance policy to a
purchaser of Florida property as an inducement for an incident to such
sale shall constitute a negotiation, sale and delivery of such contract in
this state.
II. VENDOR AND PURCHASER
Statute of Frauds: specific performance-A number of cases for the
specific performance of real estate contracts were considered by the Florida
Supreme Court during the past biennium. Most of these cases were not
particularly significant. The requirements for removing an oral contract
15. FLA. StrT. §§ 74.05-74.15 (1953).
16. Laws of Fla., c. 29724 (1955).
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from the Statute of Frauds were reviewed in Miller v. Murray." To be en-
titled to specific performance of an oral contract the plaintiff must not
only establish the contract by a preponderance of the evidence, but by
clear, definite and certain proof. The following elements are necessary:
(1), payment of all or part of the consideration, whether it be in money or
in services; (2), possession by the alleged vendee; and (3), the effectuation
of valuable and permanent improvements with the consent of the vendor;
or (4), in the absence of such improvements, the proof of such facts as
would make the transaction a fraud upon the purchaser if the contract
were not enforced.'8 Further, the acts claimed to have been done under
the oral contract must be referable exclusively thereto. 19  Specific per-
formance was denied in the instant case, and the the decision of Cottages,
Miami Beach, Inc. v. Wegman20 was distinguished in that the plaintiff
in the latter case had changed her position significantly in reliance on the
alleged contract.
The remaining cases concerning specific performance turned primarily
upon the terms of the contract. In Adams v. Stoffer 2' it was held that an
assignment of the option to the vendor's husband was no excuse for non-
perfornance on her part. Since by its terms the option was assignable, it
was immaterial that the husband or anyone else had acquired it. A provi-
sion that time shall be of the essence may be waived and was in fact found
to be waived under the circumstances of Forbes v. Babel.22 The utility of
specific performance against a defaulting vendee was depicted in Clements
v. Leonard.2 3 It was therein held proper to decree specific performance
and, upon failure of the purchaser to perform upon a specified date, to
order the property sold and the proceeds applied to the satisfaction of the
vendor's claim against the vendee. Further, the court may, in its sound
discretion, authorize the collection of any unpaid balance by execution on
other leviable assets of the defaulting vendee.2' The court distinguished
the earlier case of McCaskill v. Dekle,25 which refused a deficiency decree
under similar circumstances, by stating that a deficiency decree would under
the facts of that case have been inequitable. Considering the clear language
expressed therein,26 the instant decision 27 appears to be a retreat therefrom.
In Rosenthal v. Le May28 an option to repurchase contained a provision
that it was unassignable and that the holders would not convey, alienate, or
17. 68 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1953).
18. Id. at 596.
19. Ibid.
20. 57 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1951). See Boyer, Survey of Real Property Law, 8
lMhAMi L.Q. 389, 392 (1954).
21. 69 So.2d 884 (Fla. 1954).
22. 70 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1953).
23. 70 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1954).
24. Ibid.
25. 88 Fla. 28;, 102 So. 252 (1924).
26. 88 Fla. 285, 294, 102 So. 252, 255 (1924)
27. Clements v. Leonard, 70 So.2d 840 (Mla. 1954).
28. 72 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1954).
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transfer within a certain period of time without first offering the property
to the other party. In order to obtain the money with which to exercise
the option to rebuy the building, the option holders placed a mortgage on it.
It was held that the mortgage did not constitute an alienation under the
meaning of the contract. Of course, a contract cannot be enforced against
one who is not a party to it. Thus, in Brown v. Griffin,2'2 where only the
husband signed the contract for the sale of property in which his wife was
a co-owner, specific performance could not be obtained against the wife
or her estate. The vendees, however, had made improvements on the land
with the knowledge of both the husband and wife. Under these circum-
stances specific performance could be had to the extent of compelling a
conveyance of the husband's interest with an abatement of purchase price
for the wife's unconveyed interest, and a reimbursement from the wife's
estate for the value of the improvements erected on her portion. 0 In Cox
v. LaPota,' an estoppel was invoked against the vendors when they, know-
ing that their signatures were not properly witnessed, misled the vendees
by subsequent addition of signatures of alleged witnesses.a la
Equitable enforcement of a non-competitive covenant was sought in
the case of Giehler v. Ward.32 In this case the grantors had agreed in
their deed not to compete in business with the grantees for a space of three
years. The defendant vendors did in fact violate their covenant, and, in a
prior suit, the vendees brought an action for an injunction. In the instant
suit the vendees sought to have the effective 'date of the covenant advanced
so that they would obtain the full three year period of noncompetition
originally provided. Relief was refused because the original agreement
provided for a term of noncompetition "from the date of the agreement"
and not for a total period of three years.'3 Thus the relief sought would
amount to making an entirely different contract. In the case of Tobler v.
Goolsby34 an option to buy additional land was contingent upon prompt
payments on a purchase money mortgage. Upon failure to make the first
payment when due, the vendor instituted foreclosure. It was held that
default automatically terminated the option. Termination was not in-
equitable under the circumstances; hence, the equities being equal, the
maxim "Equity follows the law" was applicable.35
29. 75 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1954).
30. Ibid.
31. 76 So.2d 662 (Fla, 1955).
31a. Apparently the court assumed that Ma. Stat. § 689.01 (1955), was
applicable. Similarly, see Abercombie v. Eidschun, 66 So.2d 875 (Fla. 1953); Scott v.
Hotel Martinque, 48 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1950).
It appears, however, that Fla. Stat. § 725.01 (1955) is applicable and that
witnesses are not necessary. Lente v. Clark, 22 Fla. 515 (1886), expressly so held.
32. 77 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1955).
33. Id. at 453.
34. 67 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1953),
35. Ibid.
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Fraud.-Smith v. Irvine"8 was an action nominally for the abatement
of the purchase price of a motel because of misrepresentation. As the
purchasers did not seek rescision, it was held that the action was in reality
an action at law for damages either for a breach of contract or for deceit.
Hence, they were not entitled to an equitable lien or any other equitable
relief. The fact that the defendants might claim homestead exemption on
much of their property purchased with money received from the plaintiffs,
and thus escape execution, was not deemed a sufficient basis for the inter-
position of equity."' Lack of information due to careless indifference to
ordinary and acceptable means of obtaining information is not a sufficient
basis for rescission 8 and, where the purchasers fail to establish grounds for
rescision based on alleged fraud and misrepresentation, defendant vendors
are not entitled to a claim for broker's commission and attorney fees.39
Marketable Title.-The effect of encroaching eaves on the marketability
of title was considered in Loeffler v. Roe. 40 Rescision was therein denied
and the encroachment held inconsequential and within the rule of
de minimis non curat lex.41 The difference between a good and merchant-
able title and a .good and merchantable title of record. was delineated in
the case of Alexander v. Cleveland.42 As the vendors had promised an
abstract showing "a good and merciiantable title," it was necessary to show
a good and merchantable title of record without resort to matters in Pais. 4
The abstract traced title to a tax deed from the State of Florida and no
further. The court stated, "In view of the insecurity attached to a bare
tax deed, an abstract showing' title based solely upon the issuance of such
deed, without a showing in the abstract of all prior procedural steps on
which it is based, is not an abstract showing good and merchantable title
of record." 44
Whether or not visible easements constitute an incumbrance within
the meaning of a contract to convey free of incumbrances was the issue in
Cassell v. Werny.45 In this case the purchasers had seen a guy wire and
large cement anchor on the property, but they were assured that the visible
use of the property was a temporary condition and would be corrected.
Hence, the usual presumption that the vendees contracted with reference
to the visible easements and adjusted the price accordingly, or else con-
36. 68 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1953).
37. Ibid.
38. Brown v. Coward, 69 So.2d 174 (Fla. 1954).
39. Thomthwaite v. Thomas, 71 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1954).
40. 69 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1954).
41. Ibid.
42. 79 So.2d 852 (Fa. 1955).
43. Such matters may be used if the contract simply requires a good and
merchantable title. Thus, in MeCaskill v. Dekle, 88 Fla. 285, 102 So. 252 (1924),
such matters could be used to prove a merchantable title based on adverse possession.
44. Alexander v. Cleveland, 79 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1955).
45. 72 So.2d 45 (Fla. 1954).
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sidered the easements beneficial to the property,46 was held inapplicable. 4
Thus, although this action was for a declaratory decree to construe the con-
tract, the test of an incumbrance was held the same as that applied in an
action brought by a grantee for breach of the covenant against incumbrances
in a warranty deed.48
Miscellaneous.-Neither reformation nor rescision was decreed for
parties May and Holley in a repeat appearance49 before the Supreme Court
in a dispute involving encroachments. 0 It was held that such a right based
on mutual mistake cannot be claimed against a third party bona fide grantee
without notice.51 Further, reformation under such circumstances is based
on the assumption of a prior complete meeting of the minds on the exact
subject matter of the deed and does not apply to a situation wherein the
parties are mistaken as to the identity of the property.52 In another case53
it was held that the purchasers could not rescind for non-compliance of the
vendors with the original terms when those terms were later superseded.
II1. ESTATES, DOWER, HOMESTEAD AND FUTURE INTERESTS
Homestead.-The perplexing ramifications of the homestead law con-
tinued to busy the Florida Supreme Court. A clear distinction between an
estate or title and homestead status was delineated in the case of Wakeman
v. Noble54 wherein it was determined that the County Judge's Court had
jurisdiction to determine the homestead status of real property. The con-
stitutional provision giving the Circuit Courts exclusive original jurisdicton
in all cases "involving the titles or boundaries of real estate" 5 does not
preclude the County Judge's Court from determining the homestead char-
acter of land. The question of homestead is primarily a matter of status
rather than an estate or title. Thus, "the homestead character of property
at the time of the owner's death depends upon its use and his decision as
head of the family. The title is affected by neither."5  The manner in
which the title descends or is transformed into a life estate on the death
of the homestead owner is simply consequential."
Two cases involving the conveyance of the homestead show no signifi-
cant developments. In Regero v. Daugherty,"8 the validity of a conveyance,
46. Van Ness v. Royal Phosphate Co., 60 Fla. 284, 53 So. 381 (1910). The
doctrine of this ease was followed in Pasco County v. Johnson, 67 So.2d 639 (Fla.
1953), wherein it was stated that the presence of a visible highway did not give rise
to a breach of the statutory warranty in a deed which had no reservation for the road.
47. Cassell v. Werny, 72 So.2d 45 (Fla. 154).
48. Van Ness v. Royal Phosphate Co., supra note 46.
49. The former case was May v. Holley, 59 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1952). See
BOYER, Survey of Real Property, 8 MIAMi L.Q. 389, 403 and 418 (1954).
50. Holley v. May, 75 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1954).
51. Id. at 697.
52. Id at 698.
53. Public Realty Co. v. Krieger, 70 So.2d 834 (Fla. 1954).
54. 73 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1954).
55. FLA. Co NsT., Art. V, § 11.
56. Wakeman v. Noble, 73 So.2d 873 at 871 (Fla. 1954).
57. Ibid.
58. 69 So.2d 178 (Fla. 1954).
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by a mother to her daughter, for services rendered was upheld. It may be
noted that although the constitutional provisions 9 do not say anything
specifically about conveying for an adequate or valuable consideration, the
tenor of earlier cases suggests that consideration is essential. 0 Some of the
later cases, however, say that it is not.0 ' It is significant, however, that in
those homestead cases asserting that consideration is not essential, the court
either bad additional grounds for the decision or did in fact find considera-
tion." As consideration was present in the Regero case, 3 it contributes
nothing to this important matter. The case of Thompson v. Thompson
60
was resolved on the basis of the statute of limitations. It was held that
where the deed had been recorded for more than twenty years prior to the
institution of the action for cancellation, where there was no claim of dis-
ability or minority, allegations of fraud, forgery, concealment or other defects,
and where the record indicated that all parties knew of the deed and had
been sui furls for more than seven years prior to the institution of the suit,
the deed could not be cancelled. 5
Homestead descent problems continue to be a fruitful source of litiga-
tion. The case of Stephens v. Campbell"0 concerned the applicability of
those provisions to a factual situation involving the wife as head of the
family. She supported the husband; all her children were by a former
marriage and being adult, were not dependent on her. It was held that the
homestead provisions would control and that the wife could not devise
the homestead. 7 A dissenting opinion" based on the literal wording of
the Florida Constitution and statutes to the effect that the prohibition on
devising the homestead applies only to the husband and not the wife, has
some merit but is not consistent with precedent applying homestead provi-
sions equally in situations where the wife as well as the husband is the head
59. FLA. CONST., Art. X, §§ 1, 4.
60. Florida Natl. Bank v. Winn, 158 Fla. 750, 30 So.2d 298 (1947); John v.
Purvis, 145 Fla. 354, 199 So. 340 (1940); McEwen v. Larson, 136 Fla. 1, 185 So. 866
(1939); Norman v. Cannon, 133 Fla. 710, 182 So. 903 (1938); Bess v. Anderson, 102
Fla. 1127, 136 So. 898 (1931); Jackson v. Jackson, 90 Fla. 563, 107 So. 255 (1925);
Norton v. Baya, 88 Fla. 1, 102 So. 361 (1924).
61. Denham v. Sexton, 48 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1950); Scoville v. Scoville, 40 So.2d
840 (Fla. 1949).
62. In Denham v. Sexton, supra note 61, the homestead was held as an estate
by the entireties and both the husband and wife had previously conveyed some of the
land. A later grantee of the widow sought to cancel the former deeds. Relief was
denied, It is to be noted that in all cases in which such gratuitous conveyances were
voided, the complaining parties were children of the homestead owner and had a
protected interest under the constitution. In this case, the plaintiff had no such
interest. Further, the children themselves could not complain since the homestead
had been owned by the entireties and would vest in the snrviving spouse in any event.
In Scoville v. Scoville, supra note 61, the court did not think the land in question
was a homestead at the time of conveyance, and, further, the court found consideration.
63. 69 So.2d 178 (Fla. 1954).
64. 70 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1954).
65. Ibid.
66. 70 So.2d 579 (Fla. 1954).
67. Ibid.
68. Stephens v. Campbell, 70 So.2d 579 (Fla. 1954), J. 'Ferrell dissenting at 580.
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of the family. In Sheaf v. Klose 9 it was determined that an adult son's
moving into the home with his mother was not of itself sufficient to convert
it into a homestead. There must be an intent on her part to make it such,
and the fact that she may bestow various gratuities on him is not sufficient
to show that he is dependent on her for support. There must be an intent
to convert the realty into a h6mestead status. Factually in contrast to this
case is Brodgon v. McBride,0 wherein homestead status attached although
the daughter did not live in her father's home. It was held that the daughter
who lived with her divorced mother was entitled to the benefit of the
homestead descent laws as to an apartment house owned by the divorced
father. The father lived there with his second wife and made it his home.
The court stated that, since the minor child was absent from the father's
home by order of a court, she had a right to demand that he provide her
with the necessities of life and such comforts as her station in life war-
ranted. Thus, the devise to the second wife was ineffective.
7'
Exemption ftom levy.-Two cases during the last two years involved
the question of homestead exemption from execution by creditors. In
DeJonge v. Wayne"2 it was held that a wife's property was not homestead
property simply because her husband made mortgage payments and did
minor repairs on their dwelling place. The property therefore was subject
to execution by judgment creditors of the wife. In short, the husband
was head of the family, not the wife, and so her separate property could
be levied on by her creditors. The case of Buckels v. Tomer '12 held that
an owner of rural land who resided thereon was entitled to have his entire
contiguous tract of land exempt from execution by his creditors although
he subdivided a large portion of the area and laid it out in streets and
building lots. As long as he owns land on both sides of the platted streets
he is entitled to an exemption for all of the land.
Taxation.-In L'Engle v. Forbes'3 a reserve officer recalled to active
duty was successful in avoiding a waiver of his homestead tax exemption
although he did not claim it by April 1 of the year in question. As the
controlling statute74 of the case has since been changed,' 5 the decision
is not particularly significant.
Co-tenancies.-Morrison v. Byrd 6 involved the claim of a purchaser
from one co-tenant. The former owner died in 1933 survived by a number
of children, one of them named D. V. Byrd. Byrd continued to reside
on the land and later acquired a tax deed thereto. In 1943, he and his
69. 75 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1954).
70. 75 So,2d 770 (Fla. 1954).
71. ibid.
72. 76 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1954).
72a. 78 So.2d 861 (Fla. 1955).
73. 81 So.2d 214 (Fla. 1955).
74. FLA. STAT. § 192.55 (1951).
75. FtA. STAT. § 192.161 (1953).
76. 72 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1954).
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wife conveyed the land by warranty deed to Mrs. Morrison. She stayed
there and paid the taxes for more than seven years. While it was conceded
that normally a conveyance of one of the several co-tenants does not
constitute color of title to the whole tract to the exclusion of the others,
it was held that a deed purporting to convey the entire interest of one
who holds only an undivided interest may constitute color of title, and
the grantee may acquire title by adverse possession against the other
co-tenants.77 It was thus held under the facts of the case that the deed
from D. W. Byrd did constitute color of title to the whole tract and that
Mrs. Morrison acquired title by adverse possession.
78
The case of Brocato v. Brocato0 involved an estate by the entireties
in an action by the wife to foreclose a mortgage against her husband.
The property was originally conveyed to both the husband and wife who
in turn jointly gave a purchase money mortgage. The mortgagee sub-
sequently assigned the mortgage to the wife. It was held the wife could
not enforce the mortgage against the property as she was one of the makers
of the note and mortgage, and the assignment to her acted as a satisfaction
of the obligation,
The case of Forehand v. Peacock"' involved an agreement between
an aged mother and her daughter to hold a piece of property as joint tenants
or by the entireties. It was correctly held, of course, that an estate by the
entireties could only exist between husband and wife.82  It was stated,
however, that such an agreement would be sufficient to create an agreement
between the parties not to partition the property and to vest title thereof
in the survivor. It would thus amount to a joint tenancy with right of
survivorship subject to a covenant not to partition. The agreement was
before the court because the aged mother, the plaintiff, was having
difficulty with the daughter and her husband. The court said: "Of course,
such agreements, like all others, may be dissolved for fraud, overreachings
or for other grounds recognized by law."813 It is interesting to note that
the agreement between the mother and daughter was entered into after
they had received a deed of the land as tenants in common. Although
the agreement is itself probably not sufficient without a formal conveyance
to convert the estate into a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, it can,
in the absence of fraud, overreach, or other inequitable circumstances, bc
enforced specifically to accomplish the desired result.
Future Interests.-The question of a breach of the condition in a fee
simple determinable was the issue in Dade County v. North Miami Beach.84
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. 74 So.2d 58 (Fla. 1954).
80. Ibid.
81. 77 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1955).
82. Id. at 626.
83. Ibid.
84. 69 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1954).
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The deed provided that the land was to be used and maintained for park
purposes and that the reversion was retained by the grantor in the
event of the discontinuance of the property for park purposes and
the maintenance as such. The deed was delivered in 1934 and
the suit was filed in 1951. Evidence disclosed that the county had
exercised dominion and control over the property and was proceeding,
although somewhat slowly, with plans for improvement. The court
concluded that the record negatived anything to show an abandon-
ment by the county, and refused to decree a reversion to the grantor."
The case of Sanderson v. Sanderson8" involved the construction of a
will and the nature of the estate granted. It illustrates the significance
of careful draftsmanship although in the particular case two examples
of ambiguous language counteracted each other and afforded the court
an opportunity to protect the titles of innocent grantees. In this
case the husband and wife made a joint will which provided ". . . we
have jointly and severally agreed, as husband and wife, that the entire
estate of the one passing away first shall belong in its entirety to
the one still living to use and enjoy as they wish to do, without the
expense of executors and administrators. Any residue of the estate
left after both husband and wife have passed away and all their just
debts and expenses paid, shall be divided equally between . . ."8 It
was held that the will created only a life estate in the survivor, but that
the survivor had a power of disposition during her lifetime. Hence,
grantees of the widow were entitled to a clear fee simple title. The court
stated that a power may be created by implication as well as by express
language. More careful draftsmanship would have made it clear that the
survivor received either a fee simple estate with no strings attached, or
else a life estate with a clear power of disposition.
A significant development in the field of future interests in the past
biennium was the invalidation of the Florida statute88 limiting the effective-
ness of reverter provisions in private conveyances. This statute was held
unconstitutional as applied to pre-existing reverter clauses.89  The effect,
of course, is almost a complete frustration of the legislative attempt to clear
private titles from outmoded forfeiture provisions of unlimited duration. 0
As to such future created provisions, there would seem to be no question
but that the legislation is valid. However, the real problem is with the
85. Ibid.
86. 70 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1954).
87. Id. at 365.
88- FLA. STAT. § 689.18 (1953). This act was passed in 1951. See Boyer,
Survey of Real Property Law, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 389, 411 (1954).
89. Biltmore Village, Inc. v. Rotolante, 71 So.2d 77 (Fla. 1954). Noted in
9 MIAMi L.Q. 232 (1955).
90. See the preamble to c. 26927, Laws of Fla. (1951); FLA. STAT. § 689.18
(1953).
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old limitations, and, as to them apparently, the only method of clearing
title is the purchase of releases. 'Thc indirect effect of the Biltmore decision9'
on tax titles has already been discussed in this survey,92 and, as noted
therein, has already been changed by legislation."'
IV. DEEDS: RECORDING; CANCELLATION; DELIVERY.
Recording and priorities.-Thrce cases involving the Recording Act
94
were among the most interesting "litigators" concerning deeds during the
past two years. The facts of Moyer v. Clark ' were rather simple. The
owner conveyed to the defendant in 1932, but the deed was not recorded
until 1953. In the meantime, the former owner died and his administrator
conveyed the land to plaintiff.
(1)
0 --------------------------------------------------- Def.
deed given by deed
O's Administra-
tor on 4/20/53 (2)
P1. Clark
III a suit to quiet title by the second grantee, the defendant asserted that
the plaintiff was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice within
the Recording Act. The plaintiff in turn sought to overcome this defense
by asserting the twenty year statute of limitations.90 The twenty year
statute of limitations was held inapplicable."7 That statute bars attack on
a deed which is on record for twenty years and has no effect on other
deeds, In the instant ease, both the plaintiff and the defendant were
relying and claiming through the last deed on record, namely O's, and
neither one was attacking it nor asserting a claim adverse to it. Hence,
the defendant would prevail unless the plaintiff were a bona fide purchaser
for value without notice.
In Hull v. Maryland Casualty Co.08 a judgment creditor was seeking
(1)
G ------------------.......------------------- ---.Husband
*, deed conveyed 1927,
recorded 1950 inherited as
Judgment in! sole heir
1932, 33, 35. (2) (3) of husband
Creditor Plaintiff
91. Biltmore Village, Inc. v, Rotolante, supra note 89.
92. See test discussion following note 3 supra.
93. Laws of Fla. c. 29959 (1955).
94. FLA. ST'r. § 695.01 (1941).
95. 72 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1954).
96. FLA. STAT. § 95.23 (1953).
97. Moyer v. Clark, 72 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1954).
98. 79 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1954).
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priority over a prior unrecorded dcced. The deed was executed before
but recorded after the judgments were obtained.
The decision was in favor of the heir of the grantee in the prior unrecorded
deed. Although the Recording Act protects creditors and subsequent pur-
chasers for a valuable consideration and without notice,"' notice was imputed
in this case by the record of other instruments mentioning the rights of
the plaintiff's ancestor. Neither the deed itself nor the prior purchase
contract were recorded, but there were recorded assignments of the original
contract and a blanket mortgage mentioning the contract to convey. The
case is in accord with previous decisions to the effect that the record is
notice not only of its own contents, but also of such other facts as would
have been Iearned had the record been examined and the inquiries sug-
gested thereby been duly prosecutd. 0 0  Although the statute does not
specify only judgment or lien creditors as being entitled to protection
against unrecorded instruments, that limitation has been previously im-
posed.101 and is obviously necessary for the pragmatic functioning of the
Recording Act. Although the court did not see the necessity of discussing
the chain of title, it is clear that the mortgage at least would be within
the chain and would put third persons on notice to ascertain the extent
of the vendees' interest under the various contracts therein recited. If the
contract itself had not been recorded, as was the case at bar, it is difficult
to see how an assignment thereof would be within the chain of title.
However, if such an assignment were noted by an abstract company, which
is very likely because of their unofficial tract indexes, then one seeing
such an abstract and assignment would be put on inquiry, a type of actual
notice, and would then have to ascertain the extent of such interests.102
Bauman v. Peacock,0 the third case involving the Recording Act, is
perhaps the most noteworthy of the three. In this case one Stone entered
into a contract to convey to one Holmes in March of 1952. This contract
was recorded. Holmes then assigned the contract to Peacock in August
of the same year. The assignment was not recorded. In 1953 Bauman
secured a judgment against Holmes for $4,000, and Peacock sought to quiet
his title against the judgment of Bauman. Both Peacock and Holmes
before him had been in possession through tenants. It was held in favor
of Peacock on the basis that his possession constituted notice to Bauman,
hence the unrecorded assignment was superior to Bauman's judgment. 10
99. FLA. STAT. § 695.01 (1953).
100. Sapp v. Warner, 105 Fla. 245, 257, 141 So. 124, rehearing denied, 143 So.
648, motion to recall denied, 144 So. 481 (1932).
101. Ringling Trust and Savings Bank v. Vhitfield Estate, 32 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.
(1929), cert. denied 280 U.S. 573 (1929); Rogers v. Munnerlyn, 36 Fla. 591, 18 So.
669 (1895); Eldridge, Dunham & Co. v. Post, 20 Fla. 579 (1884).
102. Cf. Lassiter v. Curtiss.Bright Co., 129 Fla. 728, 177 So. 201 (1937), con-
cerning the recording of a contract not entitled to record,











This decision generally is in accord with the proposition that possession
constitutes notice of any outstanding interest.'0 5  A refinement of that
proposition, however, was raised in the instant case and disposed of rather
summarily. It was alleged that the tenants of Peacock were the same as
the tenants of Holmes, and therefore their possession would not constitute
notice. The decision recognized previous holdings to this effect, 06 but
concluded that the trial judge had decided the tenants were not the same.
Additional grounds for the decision were given in what appears to
be an extraordinary curtailment of the effectiveness of the Recording Act.
It was stated that the judgment creditor was not entitled to the protection
afforded a bona fide purchaser without notice since lie was asserting a lien
against a vendee's interest under a contract to purchase. It was asserted
that the bona fide purchaser rule applies only to purchasers of t1e legal
interest, and as between competing equal equities, the prior equity prevails. 0T
In view of the fact that the Recording Act states: "No conveyance, transfer
or mortgage of real property, or of any interest therein, nor any lease for
a term of one year or longer, shall be good and effectual in law or equity
against creditors or subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration and
P108without notice, unless the same be recorded according to law; .... ,
(emphasis added) the expression of the court seems unwarranted.
Miscellaneous.-In a number of suits seeking cancellation of deeds,
it was held that the evidence was insufficient under the facts of each case
to prove duress,109 mental incompetency, 1 0 and fraud and undue influ-
ence."' In a similar suit involving forgery," 2 it was held that the Dead
Man's Statute'13 did not preclude the grantor from testifying after the
grantee had died that the purported deed was a forgery. It was asserted
105. See Synopsis of Florida cases in a comment in 6 MIAMI L.Q. 595 at 600
(1952).
106. Stockton v. National Bank, 45 Fla. 590, 34 So. 897 (1903); Feinberg v.
Steams, 56 Fla. 279, 47 So. 797 (1908). Contra, Bell v. Protheroe, 199 Okla. 562,
198 P.2d 868 (1948).
107. Bauman v. Peacock, 80 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1955).
108. FLA. STAT. § 695.01 (1953).
109. Cooper v. Cooper, 69 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1954).
110. Davis v. Wigfall, 70 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1954).
111. Marquette v. Hathaway, 76 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1954).
112. Security Trust Co. v. Calafones, 68 So.2d 562 (Fla. 1953).
113. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1953).
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that to hold otherwise would permit a person to acquire for his estate
property of another without the knowledge and consent of the other.,1 4
In an interesting case involving quitclaim deeds from a municipality,
it was held that a subsequent quitclaim deed of the same land to a different
grantee was not itself a repudiation of the prior quitclaim deed."5  The
city had acquired the land by means of foreclosing tax liens. It then
executed and delivered a quitclaim deed to the first grantee, but this dced
was said to be invalid because the action was not formally approved by
city council. Later, a second quitclaim deed was executed and delivered
for the same land, and this deed was formally approved by city council.
It was held that the first deed was voidable only and not void, and that the
second deed was not necessarily a repudiation of the first since a quitclaim
deed did not necessarily purport to convey any particular interest. 110 Hence,
the quiet title suit by the purchaser from the second grantee was properly
dismissed.1
7t
Deeds from the I.I.F., as all other deeds, must be delivered to be
effective to pass title; signing and placing thereon the official seal is not
sufficient. 18 Estoppel may be asserted in defense of a title but not to
establish one,119 and a judgment in ejectment must comply with the
statute"10 requiring it to specify the dimensions and location of the land
encroached upon.' 2 1  Also, in an ejectment action, the measure of com-
pensation for improvements made in good faith by a possessor under
color of title, is the amount by which the value of the land is increased,
and not the cost, less of course, the reasonable rental value while the
party claiming compensation was in possession." -  A proper case for
reformation is made out when the land conveyed was neither the land
the grantor intended to convey nor the land the grantee expected to
receive.123
V. RIGHTS IN LAND
Covenants, easements, water rights.-The mast significant development
in this area of Florida property law was the express holding that the right
to enforce a restrictive covenant was not a property right within constitu-
tional guaranties.' 21 Hence, a governmental unit need not compensate
individuals for the loss of such a right to enforce the covenant when
neighboring land is taken for public purposes.' 25 In the case decided,' 28
114. See note 112 supra.
115. Goldtrap v. Bryan, 77 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1954).
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. Dolores Land Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 68 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1953).
119. Naples v. Morris, 71 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1954).
120. FLA. STAT. § 70,05 (1953).
121. Florida Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Robbins, 81 So,2d 193 (Fla. 1955).
122. Arey v. Williams, 81 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1955).
123. Spear v. McDonald, 67 So.2d 630 (Fla. 1953).




the issuc was raised whether a school could be built on restricted land,
and, also, if such were done, whether the school board would have to
compensate all the owners of the land for whose benefit the restriction
was imposed. It was held, and correctly so, that the restriction was not
enforceable against governmental units. Then, after a review of the
conflicting authorities, the court decided to adopt what had been termed
the minority view and hold that such compensation to owners of neighboring
land need not be given. "2  The court followed the decision of a Georgia
case, 12 8 which in turn relied heavily on a federal decision, 20 in reaching
what it termed the trend of decisions and the better view. The policy
considerations of relieving governmental units from intolerable burdens in
eminent domain cases, should the contrary view be adopted, was an
important factor."10 The decision, of course, can be readily justified, and
is pragmatic.
In other cases involving restrictive covenants, it was held that a re-
striction against liquor sales except as an adjunct to a regular meal pre-
cluded operation of a cocktail lounge and package store, and prohibited
any sales except to customers who ordered a regular meal.' 31 In deter.
mining whether the benefit and burden ran with the land in another
case,132 the court concluded that the benefit did not run where the co-
venant used the words "successors and assigns" on the part of the grantee,
but did not use them on behalf of the grantor. In another decision' 33 a
covenant was upheld providing that no building should be erected unless
the plans were submitted to and approved by the grantor.
The extent of riparian rights and the construction of the Florida
Statute' 3 vesting the title to submerged lands of navigable rivers in upland
owners was at issue in Duval Engineering and Contracting Co. v. Sales.353
It was held that the act vesting such title in the upland owners was con-
tingent on their bulkheading and filling in to the edge of the channel,
and until that was done, the upland owner did not get a fee simple title,
but that a reversion remained in the I.I.F. Further, under the facts of the
case, the I.I.F. had conveyed a perpetual easement for the construction
of a bridge over the St. John's River prior to such improvement by the
upland owner. It was further decided that the upland owner's riparian
127. ibid.
128. Anderson v. Lynch, 188 Ga. 154, 3 S.E.2d 85 (1939).
129. United States v. Certain Lands, 112 Fed. 622, 628-629 (C.C.R.I. 1899);
aff'd. 153 Fed. 876 (Ist Cir. 1907).
130. Board of Public Instruction v. Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So.2d 637, 643 (Fla.
1955). The same considerations were paramount in Sackett v. Los Angeles City School
District, 118 Cal. App. 254, 5 P.2d 23 (1931).
131. Clay v. Lamont, 62 So.2d 227 (Fla. 1953).
132. Washingtonion Apartment -otel v. Schneider, 75 So.2d 907 (Fla. 1954).
133. Engvalson v. Webster, 74 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1954).
134. FLA. STAT. §§ 271.01-271.08 (1953).
135. 77 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1955).
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rights"'  were so negligibly interfered with by the bridge that he was not
entitled to compensation.
1 87
In a number of other cases it was held that an implied easement for
hauling water for limited purposes by mule teams and barrels could not
be enlarged to permit the installation of pipes and a modern irrigation
system;138 that a two foot encroachment on an easement where the speci-
fied width was merely descriptive and where the encroachment did not
materially obstruct the way, was not actionable;'30 and that a person has
no right to divert the natural flow of surface waters and cast it in quantity
on the lands of another although such result may follow the improvement
of one's own land.140 In a return engagement before the Supreme Court
in a dispute involving subsurface waters the plaintiff was again success-
ful. 4  In the previous case' 42 it was held that he could recover for the
intentional interference with the flow of subterranean water. In the latest
decision between the parties, a judgment for the defendant was set aside
on the ground that the evidence did not show that he was not negligent
in interrupting the flow of subterranean waters.
143
VI. MORTGAGES AND LIENS
Mortgages.-Perhaps the most significant development in the law of
mortgages resulted from the decision in the Kirtley case 144 which held
that although foreclosure of a mortgage might be barred by the twenty
year statute of limitations, 145 the mortgagee could still recover for taxes
paid on the mortgaged property.' 46 The rule of the case has since been
changed by statute147 and is discussed supra under Legislation. 48 In an-
other suit 140 involving the application of the same statute of limitations,
foreclosure of the mortgage in issue was subject to two conditions pre-
cedent: (1) foreclosure of mortgages on other land, and (2) transfer of
the land by the mortgagor. Since the record contained evidence and
matters relating solely to the second condition, namely that the mortgagor
still owned the land in litigation, the court refused to decree whether the
lien was void because of the statute of limitations, but reversed the lower
court and ordered a dismissal with leave to amend so that evidence could
136. I.e., the right of unobstructed view over the river, the right of ingress and
egress, and the right to fish and bathe in the waters. 77 So.2d 431, 434 (Fla. 1955).
137. 77 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1955).
138. Crutchfield v. Sebring Realty Co., 69 So.2d 328 (Fla. 1954).
139. Robinson v, Feltus, 68 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1953).
140. Lawrence v. Eastern Air Lines and Miami Springs, 81 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1955).
141. Labruzzo v, Atlantic Dredging and Const. Go., 73 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1954).
142. 54 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1951); Boyer, Survey of Real Property Law, 8 MIAMI L.Q.
389, 424 (1954).
143. See note 141 supra.
144. H.K.L. Realty Corp. v. Kirtley, 74 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1954).
145. Fr-A. STAT, § 95.28 (1953).
146. See note 144 supra.
147, Laws of Fla., c. 29977 (1955); FLA . STAT. § 95.28 (1955).
148. Supra page 391.
149, Hubbard v. Tebbetts, 76 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1954).
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be introduced concerning the other condition, that is whether the other
mortgages were foreclosed or not.150
In one case' 51 involving the defense of usury, it was held that since
an assumption of the mortgage by a corporation did not relieve the
original mortgagor of liability, the original mortgagor could plead the de-
fense of usury although such a defense was not then available to corpora-
tions.t1 2 The debt could thus be cancelled when the acceleration under
the terms moved the due date forward so that the ratio of outstanding
indebtedness to interest and bonus was usurious. 15  Since the legislative
changes in 195315 a corporation can now plead usury as a defense.' 55 An
interesting decision'5 involving condemnation proceedings held that a
mortgagee has no estate or interest in land, but only a lien, and hence is
not entitled to be named as party defendant in such proceedings, nor
entitled to attorney fees nor interest after the mortgage is satisfied from
the award1"'
An interesting decision 58 involving the recording Act"' held that a
creditor taking a mortgage for a pre-existing debt and forbearing to sue
without any definite time specified for such forbearance, was not a bona
fide purchaser entitled to priority over a previous unrecorded mortgage. 160
If the forbearance had been for a definite time, although for a short period,
then he would have been entitled to priority."' The decision is justified
on the basis that only subsequent bona fide purchasers are entitled to
priority over prior unrecorded instruments,1'6 2 but the statute also protects
creditors and does not require the creditors to be subsequent creditors.6 3
Presumably, if the creditor in the instant case had obtained a judgment
rather than taken a mortgage, he would have obtained priority.' 6' Credi-
tors taking mortgages to secure pre-existing debts should make certain
that their forbearance to sue is for a definite period or otherwise exercise
care to come within the scope of the subsequent bona fide purchaser
concept.
150. Ibid.
151. Sonz v. Eisenstat, 70 So.2d 373 (Fla. 1954).
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid.
154. FLA. STAT. §§ 608.01-608.67 (1953).
155. Sodi, Inc. v. Solitan, 68 So.2d 882 (Fla. 1953).
156. Shavers v. Duval, 73 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1954).
157. Ibid.
158. Gabel v. Drewrys, Ltd., U.S.A., 68 So.2d 372 (Fla. 1953).
159. FiL. STAT. § 695.01 (1953).
160. Gabel v. Drewrys, Ltd., U.S.A., note 158 supra.
161. Ibid.
162. FLA. STAT. § 695.01 (1953).
163. The statute reads: "No conveyance . . . shall be good and effectual in law
or equity against creditors or subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration and
without notice, unless the same be recorded according to law . (emphasis supplied.)
164. See Hull v. Maryland Casualty Co., 79 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1954), where the
judgment creditor did not get priority because he was charged with notice. The
case is discussed supra p. 402. See also comment, 6 MIAIi L.Q. 595, 601 (1952).
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Other cases involving mortgages were only significant factually and
involved such issues as cancellation for duress,6 5 construing deeds as
mortgages or conditional sales,' 06 and the parol evidence rule.'0 7
Mechanics' Liens.-IThe Mechanics' Lien law continues to be a fruitful
source of litigation. The protection afforded materialmen by the 1953
amendment 68 to the lien law is illustrated by the case of Beam v. Jerome
Lumber and Supply Co.,' 9 which held that a materialnan who failed to
notify the owner of his intention of claim a lien until the owner had paid
the contractor all but a small balance was entitled to a claim only against
the balance due.170 Under the legislation now in force,"" the owner is
seemingly required to withhold 20% of each progress payment for the
protection of mechanics and materialmen. That portion of the statute
which extends the lien to specially fabricated materials, 172 although not
incorporated into the property if the non-incorporation was not the fault
of the materialman, was construed in Surf Properties, Inc. v. Markowitz
Brothers, Inc.'7 3 It was therein held that specially fabricated was not the
same as specially ordered, and hence the lien would not cover unused
stock items which could readily be used for a swimming pool elsewhere.
174
A mechanics' lien extends to architect's services, but failure of the
complaint to allege that the services or materials were used on the im-
proved property fails to state a cause of action. 7 ' A sub-sub-contractor
has no protection and is unable to file liens against owners or contractors
in case of default of subcontractors.'70 The contractor's sworn statement
to the owner concerning full payment of all lienors is a condition pre-
cedent to filing suit by the contractor although the owner may not have
demanded it.' 7  Further, a supplier may be estopped to assert a lien
where he remains silent and lets the owner settle with the contractor. 76
The estoppel is invoked even though the owner did not ask the contractor
for the sworn statement since the supplier is at an advantage over the
owner and is presumed to know the law.179 Similarly, the owners may be
estopped when they let occupants of the land hold themselves forth as
the owners. In such case the claimant is entitled to the lien on the basis
165. Loew v. Friedman, 80 So.2d 672 (Fla. 1955).
166. Videon v. Hodge, 72 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1954); Rosenthal v. Le May, 72 So.2d
289 (Fla. 1954).
167. Schwartz v. Zaconick, 68 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1954); 74 So.2d 108 (Fla. 1954).
168. FLA. STAT. § 84,05 (11) (1953).
169. 74 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1954).
170. Ibid.
171. FLA. STAT. § 84.05 (11) (1953).
172. FLA. STAT. § 84.01 (1953) defining "Furnish materials."
173. 75 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1954).
174. Ibid.
175. Peterson v. Petersen, 67 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1953).
176. Richard Stove Co. v. Florida Bridge and Iron, Inc., 77 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1954).
177. Moore v. Crum, 68 So.2d 379 (Fla. 1953); Barton v. Horwiek, 78 So.2d 569
(Fla. 1955).
178. Southern Supply Corp. v. Lansdell, 76 So.2d 266 (Fla. 1954).
179. Ibid.
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that the occupants were the agents of the owners.'8 0 Similarly, a husband
contracting with the knowledge of the wife may be held to be agent of
the wife for purposes of subjecting the land to a mechanics' lien, but if
the issue of knowledge or consent is denied, then the case should be tried
on that point.'8t
Failure to foreclose the lien within a year extinguishes it,'12 and
failure to foreclose within the time also precludes the imposition of an
equitable lien.183 Property of an unincorporated church association cannot
be subject to a mechanics' lien because of the lack of authority to make
a binding contract,8 4 but the property can be subjected to an equitable
lien, and the lien can be litigated in a representative suit.'85 The vendor's
interest as well as the vendee's is subject to a mechanics' lien when the
vendor requires as a condition of the sale the construction of improve-
ments by the vendee.'16
VII. SPECIAL TrrLES
Adverse possession and disputed boundaries.-The roles of adverse
possession and acquiesence in disputed boundary cases were again reviewed
in the case of Holley v. May. 187 The dispute involved an encroachment
of defendant's building on plaintiff's land. It was correctly held that the
doctrine of acquiesence 88 was inapplicable to relocate the boundary
when the only evidence of acquiesence existed prior to the parties' becom-
ing aware of the encroachment. As soon as the encroachment was dis-
covered, the dispute developed. Similarly, adverse possession could not
be applied to relocate the boundary since the owner of the encroaching
structure did not return the land in dispute for taxation. 8 9 The former
case of Euse v. Gibbs,"' discussed in the previous Survey of Real Property
Law,"91 was distinguished. In that case the doctrine of acquiesence estab-
lished a new or true boundary so that the taxes paid on the land accord-
ing to its legal description constituted payment of taxes on all the land.
In the instant case the court also explained the decree asserting that the
plaintiff bad title to the land encroached upon, and pointed out that it
180. Kimbrell v. Fink, 78 So.2d 96 (Fla. 1955). Relief was denied in the instant
case, however, because the plaintiffs were barred by the one-year statute of limitations,
infra. note 182.
181. Barton v. ftorwick, supra note 177.
182. FLA. STAT. § 84.21 (1953).
183. Blanton v. Young, 80 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1955); Kimbrell v. Fink, supra
note 180.
184. Ross v. Gerung, 69 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1954).
185. Ibid.
186. Tremont Co. v. IT. A. Poasche, 81 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1955).
187. 75 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1954). Previous decision, 59 So.2d 646 (Fla. 1952).
188. The doctrine is that acquiesence in a line established after a dispute determines
the boundary between the properties. See Boyer, Survey of Real Property Laiv, 8
MIAMI L.Q. 389, 419 (1954).
189. FLA. STAT. § 95.19 (1953).
190. 49 So.2d 843 (Fla. 1951).
191. Boyer, op. cit. supra note 188, at 419,
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did not give him the right to demolish the building or entitle him to re-
ceive income. -92  Apparently lie would be left to his action at law for
damages under the authority of previous decisions. 193 In another case' 94
it was held that a deed by one co-tenant under the facts disclosed could
constitute color of title to the whiole tract and from a predicate for a claim
of title by adverse possession.
Tax deeds.-Among several decisions involving the validity of tax deeds
was the case of Addorns v. Dolan' concerning the effect of a tax sale
certificate. The dispute involved competing claimants under tax deeds.
The holder of the earlier deed in point of time sought priority on the basis
that the tax certificate forming the predicate of the later deed was merged
with the legal title and hence extinguished prior to the issuance of the
deed. To support this claim of merger, it was shown that a predecessor
in title had at one time owned both the tax certificate in issue and also
had later acquired a tax sale certificate issued pursuant to a sale of the
same land for the foreclosure of other deliquent taxes. In denying the
claim of merger, it was pointed out that the tax sale certificate was not a
conveyance of the legal title. Although the holder may have been en-
titled to have a tax deed issued after the tax sale was approved, no such
tax deed was in fact issued. The court concluded that thus the effect of
the tax sale was nothing more than a lien, and that the holder simply held
two liens on the land at that time. Hlence, there was no merger and no
extinction of the former tax certificate, and therefore a deed later procured
on the predicate of such certificate would be valid.
The validity of the notice sent to deliquent owners was the controll-
ing issue in two recent cases. In the one case 0 6 an official notice was
properly sent only to the husband when the land was owned by a married
couple as tenants by the entireties. Because of a clerical error the notice
sent to the wife was misaddressed. It was held that such notice was in-
sufficient and that a tax deed issued pursuant thereto was voidT 7  In
the other case' s the tax payer's name did not appear on the tax rolls,
and hence the clerk resorted to the records of the tax collector in accord-
ance with the statute. 0 These records were incorrect, and the last known
taxpayer's name and address was wrong. It was nevertheless held that
such notice was effective, and that a tax deed issued pursuant thereto was
valid. The court stated that to hold otherwise would place an intolerable
burden on the clerk of court, and make it possible for land owners to
192. Holley v. May, 75 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1954).
193. Johnson v. Killian, 157 Fla. 754. 27 So.2d 345 (Fla. 1946); McCreary v.
Lake Boulevard Sponge Exchange Co., 133 Fla. 740, 183 So. 7 (1938).
194. Morrison v. Byrd, 72 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1954).
195. 67 So.2d 213 (Fla. 1953).
196, Montgomery v. Cipson, 69 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1954).
197. Ibid.
198. Mullin v. Polk County, 76 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1954).
199. FLA. STAT. § 194.51 (1953).
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thwart the orderly collection of taxes by furnishing tax officials with in-
correct addresses..
200
The validity of the in rem foreclosure proceedings for the foreclosure
of drainage taxes under Florida Statute Section 298.75 was evaded in the
case of Sarasota-Fruitville Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands.2 l In this case
the Drainage District brought foreclosure proceedings and the trial court
refused to issue notices to appear because of doubt as to the constitution-
ality of the statute. The Drainage District appealed. The Supreme Court
refused to rule on the matter because there were no defendants before
the court. The Court based its decision on the familiar principle that only
actual controversies are reviewed by appellate courts, and pointed out that
it was authorized to issue advisory opinions only to the Governor of the
State and then only concerning his powers and duties under the Constitu-
tion.202 Perhaps mandamus was the proper remedy.
Eminent dornain.-The effectiveness of the statute20 3 providing for
a summary method of obtaining possession pending the completion of
condemnation proceedings, previously held valid when utilized by gov-
ernmental units, 204 was extended to apply to eminent domain proceed-
ings exercised by public utility corporations clothed with such power.
205
The relationship between eminent domain and the police power was again
involved in the return engagement of Miami v. Romer.20  After the court
had previously held that setback lines could be established under the police
power without the necessity of compensation,20 7 the plaintiff landowner
amended his complaint to allege in substance that the setback lines were
used as a subterfuge for the acquisition of land for street and sidewalk
purposes. The court held that the amended complaint could be con-
strued to charge that the ordinance establishing the set back lines was an
unreasonable exercise of the police power enacted without regard to the
public health, safety and general welfare, and hence stated a cause of
action.20
The rights of mortgagees were involved in two condemnation pro-
ceedings. It was concluded that the mortgagee was not a proper party
as he had no estate in the land but only a lien, and hence was not entitled
to attorneys' fecs. 200  It was further held that upon satisfaction of his
200. Mullin v. Polk County, note 198 supra.
201. 80 So.2d 335 (Fla. 1955).
202. Ibid.
203. FLA. STAT. §§ 74.01-74.15 (1953).
204. State Road Dep't. v. Forehand, 56 So.2d 901 (Fla. 1952).
205. Belcher v. Florida Power and Light Co., 74 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1954).
206. 73 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1954).
207. 58 So.Zd 849 (Fla. 1952). Boyer, Survey of Real Property Law, 8 MIAN
L.Q. 389, 422 (1954).
208. Miami v. Romer, 73 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1954)
209. Shavers v. Duval County, 73 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1954).
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mortgage out of the award money he was entitled to no further interestS'0
He could, of course, decline to take satisfaction at that time and let the
mortgagor make payments in accord with the original note, but if he
does so he necessarily waives his lien.21' The lien on the award moucv
will be impressed only until final distribution, and the award money will
not be held by the court until natural expiration of the mortgage. The
mortgage, in effect, is subject to the power of eminent domain the same
as other property, and such acceleration of payment is not violative of
the due process or impairment of contract clauses of the State or Federal
Constitutions. 2 2 In another case213 it was held proper for the court to
protect a discharged attorney by impressing a lien on the award although
the landowner had not requested it.
Dedication and accretion.-!n a factually interesting case '214 involving
dedication and accretion, the plaintiff sought to acquire title to a large
portion of alluvion land. To do this, of course, he had to prove that he
was a riparian owner. He had owned land in a platted subdivision which
was never actually improved. His lot was bordered by a platted highway,
across from which was originally a small irregular tract of land bordered
by New River Sound. The street was never laid out and the whole area
was wild and unimproved. The accretion was added to the small irregular
tract. As the tract had not been originally labeled on the plat, plaintiff
alleged that it was dedicated since it was of no use to anyone. He further
alleged that the dedicated areas were abandoned by the public, and that
title to all of the street and the tract on the other side reverted to him.
In denying the plaintiff's claim, the court reaffirmed a previous decision
to the effect that unlabeled space on a plat is evidence of a reservation
rather than a dedication, and it further found that the offer to dedicate
the street had been accepted when the municipality accepted a deed thereto,
and that failure to open the street was not an abandonment when there
was no need to open it. Hence, plaintiff could not get the land by accre-
tion since he was not an upland owner, not having title beyond the
street.215  In another case"1 involving abandonment of dedicated streets,
it was held that a street was not abandoned and, accordingly, it did not
revert to the grantor when the State Road Department, after constructing
a new road, turned it over to the county to maintain for residents of
the area.
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